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Abstract
This thesis explores what patterns, if any, exist to differentiate non-malware from
malware, given only a sequence of raw bytes composing either a received file or a
fixed-length initial segment of a received file. If any such patterns are found, their
effectiveness as filtering criteria is investigated.
Keywords: affinity propagation, malware, filter
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Introduction
Background:
This work is inspired by Bilar’s prior work on opcode frequency comparisons
between samples of known non-malware and known malware [2].
Motivation:
Malware detection and defense remains an unsolved problem. Zero-day attacks
are difficult to predict and counter. On the zero-day, a NIDS can only use the data
in received packets to make a decision whether to run an executable. If a
differentiating pattern exists in the raw data of a signal, a NIDS can predict
whether it is malware with a specified probability of certainty.
Modern malware hides in slack space to keep the file size unchanged and defeats
signature-based detection with polymorphic techniques. Both of these
approaches result in statistical differences between a malicious and a nonmalicious executable. If the nature of these differences can be found by static
composition analysis, we can improve on current anti-malware technology.
Objectives:
The main objective of this work is to answer this question: can one construct a
useful malware filter by employing established techniques for pattern
recognition?
Approach:
This work consists of a sequence of experiments using the scientific method. By
asking a question within a specific framework, performing analysis, and then
answering the question based on the results, the researcher seeks first to present
the truth and then to offer an interpretation of the truth.
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Methodology: Sample Sets
Sample set selection: I used random sampling in sample sets 1 and 3, since I am
looking for classifying patterns that exist in the set of all executables. Sample sets
2A and 2B show nonrandom sampling because they were built from sample set 1
to test a hypothesis. In the sample sets, only files whose class was known were
used. In sample set 3, I assumed that samples caught by a honeypot are definitely
malware. Elimination of samples in the malware subsets occurred due to
corruption in many files that made them unreadable, but acceptably large
quantities remained.
Sample set 1: Contains 1987 malware samples from a vx.netlux.org archive and
1425 samples of non-malware from the Vista system32 directory, for a total of
3412 files. The malware ranges in size from 4 bytes to 9,499,648 bytes and
includes a mix of Win32, MS-DOS, and boot-sector malware, with an average size
of approximately 95 KB.
Sample set 2A: Contains 1425 malware samples from a vx.netlux.org archive and
1425 samples of non-ware from the Vista system32 directory, for a total of 2850
files. From sample set 1, 558 samples of malware were removed according to the
ratio 9:3:3:1:1:1, referring to the malware classes
Virus:VirTool:Trojan:HackTool:Email:Constructor. 4 additional samples were
removed from 4 of the smaller partitions.
Sample set 2B: Contains 1425 malware samples from a vx.netlux.org archive and
1425 samples of non-malware from the Vista system32 directory, for a total of
2850 files. From sample set 1, 562 Virus class samples were removed.
Sample set 3: Contains 961 samples of malware from a honeypot provided by
Matteo Cantoni of nothink.org and 1425 samples of non-malware from the Vista
system32 directory, for a total of 2386 files. The malware ranges in size from 11
bytes to 4,383,744 bytes, with an average size of approximately 167 KB.
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Sample Set 1: Malware Makeup
Sample set 1 contains 1987 files, with 1203 distinct family names. Some of the
family names are different spellings of the same basic name; however, we are not
completely certain which name groups can be merged, so we will not reduce this
number by guessing.
Out of 1987 samples, the largest family accounted for 72 samples or about 4% of
the total malware. The 2nd largest accounted for about 2% and there were 6
families that each accounted for 1%. The following bar graph shows the statistics:

Top Ten Families (Netlux)
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Sample Set 3: Malware Makeup
Sample set 3 contains 961 files. Since they are named by hash codes, I ran AVG
on a copy of the archive to get their true names. AVG found 866 threats, of which
151 were unique; of those 151, there were 24 unique families. 2 of the files
contained a threat found in an alternate data stream; 97 files were found without
contained threats. RBot was the most prevalent with 491 occurrences. The
following bar graph shows the top 10 families:

Top Ten Families (Cantoni)
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Sample set 3 shows the nature of malware distribution in the wild; the most
prevalent species captured are reflected by these skewed statistics. Around
March 2009, when these samples were captured, most of these families were
recognized by the Virus Bulletin (www.virusbtn.com). The reported overall
prevalence of each type differs from this chart, since this only refers to one
honeypot system, but most of the malware captured here was also seen in the
Virus Bulletin reports.
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Methodology: Techniques and Tools
Data Tabulation Type 1: For each sample, 256 features are extracted,
corresponding to the number of times each possible byte value appears in the
file, using the TableMaker utility.
Data Tabulation Type 2: For each sample, 256 features are extracted,
corresponding to the number of times each possible byte value appears after a
0x0F byte in the file, using the OpcodeTableMaker utility.
Sample Size Normalization: Before performing clustering or other operations,
each byte count is divided by the total number of bytes in the associated sample,
using the TableNormalizer utility.
Similarity Preprocessing: The similarity metric used is the Euclidean distance. The
apCluster utility requires a file containing a similarity measure for each pair of
tuples in the set, which is provided by the APSimilarityPreprocessor utility.
Preference Preprocessing: This is set to the default preference -15.561256 for
each tuple in a given set, so that all samples initially have the same chance to
become a representative sample. The value -15.561256 was chosen by the
authors of the apCluster utility.
Clustering: Affinity propagation, a method proposed by Frey and Dueck, is
employed using their apCluster utility. The following section explains affinity
propagation in detail.
Hex Analysis: HxD by Maël Hörz was used; it played a small but key role.
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Methodology: Affinity Propagation
In a nutshell, affinity propagation is a data clustering technique that does not
require any initial estimation external to the given data; it treats all data points as
potential representative samples and uses iterative message passing to select the
right ones. This gives it an advantage over algorithms like k-means that usually
have to be run multiple times with different initial guesses.
When the 2007 paper is quoted in this section, the term “exemplar” is defined to
mean “representative sample”.
Implementations of Frey & Dueck’s affinity propagation algorithm require a file
containing a similarity measure for each sample pair and a file containing an initial
preference for each sample. Implementations ensure that a partitioning of the
sample set is generated in accordance with the algorithm specification.
At the start of execution, the chosen preferences give the likelihood for each data
point to become a representative sample. If all preferences are equal at
initialization, then all data points are equally likely to be representative samples.
In this work, all preferences were initialized to the default value of -15.561256;
this value was used in the sample preferences file that came with the apCluster
utility provided by the authors of the 2007 paper.
At the start of execution, the initial similarity measures have the following format:
(i, k, s(i, k)). The s(i, k) refers to “how well the data point with index k is suited to
be the exemplar for data point i.”
During execution, the values of s(i, k) are updated by message passing. Two types
of messages are passed: the “responsibility” r(i, k) and the “availability” a(i, k).
The message r(i, k) is sent from point i to point k, telling k the “accumulated
evidence for how well-suited point k is to serve as the exemplar for point i, taking
into account other potential exemplars for point i.” The message a(i, k) is sent
from point k to point i, telling i “the accumulated evidence for how appropriate it
would be for point i to choose point k as its exemplar, taking into account the
support from other points that point k should be an exemplar.” Initially, all
availability values are zero.
6

The values r(i, k) at each iteration are computed as s(i, k) – max {a(i, k’) + s(i, k’)}
where the max function is calculated over all k’ such that k’ ≠ k. This means that
for each k’ other than k, its availability to and similarity with i are added to obtain
the total attractiveness of k’, and the highest such value is subtracted from the
similarity of i with k to get the net attraction of i to k. For the self-responsibility
r(k, k), we perform s(k, k) – max {a(k, k’) + s(k, k’)}; that is, the input preference
minus the highest attractiveness from k to one specific k’.
The values a(i, k) at each iteration are computed as min {0, r(k, k) + sum (max {0,
r(i’, k)}) } where the sum function is calculated over all i’ such that i’ ≠ i or k. This
means we sum all the positive external responsibility values, add that to the selfresponsibility, and use the minimum of the result and zero. Thus, a(i, k) <= 0 for
all (i, k). The values a(k, k) are computed as sum (max {0, r(i’, k)}) where i’ ≠ k.
In sum: self-availability is an aggregate of a data point’s positive responsibility
values regarding all other points; self-responsibility is the difference between the
input preference and the maximum attractiveness of all other data points;
attractiveness is the sum of availability and similarity; availability is the minimum
of zero and the sum of the point’s self-responsibility with the aggregate of its
positive external responsibility values; and responsibility is the difference
between the similarity of one point to another point and the maximum
attractiveness of all data points other than the two chosen. The calculations of a
point’s responsibility affect its availability, and vice versa. Each calculation
requires information spanning the data set; thus, at each iteration, each point’s
values are updated according to the point’s relationships with all other points.
Quoted text in this section comes from [1]. Everything in this section was written
while consulting [1].
In the next section, an example from the original paper is shown.
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Methodology: Affinity Propagation Example
This example, taken from [1], shows the iterations of affinity propagation in a
simple data set:
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Methodology: Affinity Propagation Example
In the previously shown example, part A illustrates the iterative process of
electing the representative samples. Parts B and C illustrate the message-passing
process: members tell each candidate how likely they are to vote for them, and
candidates tell each member why they should be the representative. After much
discussion, the representatives are elected.
Part D illustrates the way AP converges. The example data set had 25 points, so
initially 25 clusters existed. There is no purpose in obtaining either 1 point per
cluster or 1 cluster containing all points, so the algorithm finds the non-singleton
set of representative samples with the largest range in its shared preference.
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Experiment 1
Question: What is the natural clustering of the data set based on the byte counts
of the sample files?
Materials: Sample set 1, TableMaker, TableNormalizer, APSimilarityPreprocessor,
APPreferencePreprocessor, apCluster, ClusterSplitterAP
Procedure:
1. Run TableMaker on the sample archive
2. Run TableNormalizer on the data
3. Run APSimilarityPreprocessor on the size-normalized data
4. Run APPreferencePreprocessor to set the preferences
5. Run apCluster using the calculated similarities and preferences
6. Run ClusterSplitterAP to place all the sample files in their correct clusters
Results:
Representative sample

Class

cliconfg.exe
deploytk.dll
dvdupgrd.exe
netsh.exe
ntoskrnl.exe
Trojan.Win32.Bancos.j
Virus.MSExcel.Feeder

Good
Good
Good
Good
Good
Mal
Mal
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# files in
cluster
214
332
529
400
810
921
206

# files of
same class
45
210
387
251
519
909
205

Classifying
specificity
21%
63%
73%
63%
64%
99%
100%

Experiment 1 Analysis
In this experiment, it is observed that the two representative malware samples
collected only 13 non-malware samples between them, indicating high specificity.
Out of 1987 samples, 1114 were captured by these representative samples,
totaling about 56% of the malware; this is a low sensitivity.
The high specificity of the malware classification gives positive evidence for the 1gram count classification of signals. It is possible that these values result from
having more malware than non-malware. We can test this by using a sample set
with a 1:1 ratio and a sample set with significantly less malware.
The next experiment will test clustering with two different schemes for reducing
sample set 1 to a 1:1 ratio.
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Experiment 2A
Question: If the number of malware samples is reduced to equal the number of
non-malware samples, will the classifying specificity of malware change?
Tools: Sample set 2A, TableMaker, TableNormalizer, APSimilarityPreprocessor,
APPreferencePreprocessor, apCluster, ClusterSplitterAP
Procedure:
1. Run TableMaker on the sample archive
2. Run TableNormalizer on the data
3. Run APSimilarityPreprocessor on the size-normalized data
4. Run APPreferencePreprocessor to set the preferences
5. Run apCluster using the calculated similarities and preferences
6. Run ClusterSplitterAP to place all the sample files in their correct clusters
Results:
Representative sample
dvdupgrd.exe
lprmonui.dll
ntoskrnl.exe
Email-Worm.VBS.Brit
Net-Worm.Win32.Randon

Class

# files in
cluster
Good 639
Good 385
Good 751
Mal
188
Mal
887
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# files of
same class
502
299
521
95
877

Classifying
specificity
79%
78%
69%
51%
99%

Experiment 2B
Question: If the number of malware samples is reduced to equal the number of
non-malware samples, will the classifying specificity of malware change?
Tools: Sample set 2B, TableMaker, TableNormalizer, APSimilarityPreprocessor,
APPreferencePreprocessor, apCluster, ClusterSplitterAP
Procedure:
1. Run TableMaker on the sample archive
2. Run TableNormalizer on the data
3. Run APSimilarityPreprocessor on the size-normalized data
4. Run APPreferencePreprocessor to set the preferences
5. Run apCluster using the calculated similarities and preferences
6. Run ClusterSplitterAP to place all the sample files in their correct clusters
Results:
Representative sample
dvdupgrd.exe
regwiz.exe
serialui.dll
Trojan-Dropper.Win32.Delf.dp
VirTool.DOS.Apiary
VirTool.Win32.NPE

Class

# files in
cluster
Good 678
Good 265
Good 342
Mal
672
Mal
778
Mal
115

13

# files of
same class
545
188
255
274
773
81

Classifying
specificity
80%
71%
75%
41%
99%
70%

Experiment 2 Analysis
The results indicate a reduction in the malware classification specificity and an
increase in the non-malware classification specificity after reducing the ratio to
1:1. Despite this, one of the malware representative samples served very well in
each reduction scheme. The next experiment will determine whether that event
occurs in a different sample set with a malware:non-malware ratio that is less
than 1.
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Experiment 3
Question: If a different, smaller, set of malware samples is combined with the
same set of non-malware samples, will the trend in representative malware
samples occur again?
Tools: Sample set 3, TableMaker, TableNormalizer, APSimilarityPreprocessor,
APPreferencePreprocessor, apCluster, ClusterSplitterAP
Procedure:
1. Run TableMaker on the sample archive
2. Run TableNormalizer on the data
3. Run APSimilarityPreprocessor on the size-normalized data
4. Run APPreferencePreprocessor to set the preferences
5. Run apCluster using the calculated similarities and preferences
6. Run ClusterSplitterAP to place all the sample files in their correct clusters
Results:
Representative sample

Class

# files in
cluster

blackbox.dll
deploytk.dll
dvdupgrd.exe
regwiz.exe
370c2cc8ec1948f1cbbccb9ec58d18ed

Good
Good
Good
Good
Mal

626
306
453
301
700
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# files in
same
class
475
273
437
233
693

Classifying
specificity
76%
89%
96%
77%
99%

Experiment 3 Analysis
In experiment 2, the amount of malware was reduced relative to the amount of
non-malware, and the results showed a decrease in the specificity of malware and
an increase in the specificity of non-malware representative samples. Since that
effect happened by two different reduction schemes, it seemed to represent a
trend. Experiment 3 shows that trend in the non-malware representative
samples. However, experiment 3 was done with even fewer malware samples,
yet the lone malware representative sample had 99% specificity. This resistance
to the trend must be the result of the differences between the Cantoni archive
and the Netlux archive. This means that modern malware shares a strong
boundary with modern non-malware. It also provides preliminary evidence that
a classifying pattern exists in the frequency histogram of 1-gram features.
Since a pattern seems to have been found, the next question is whether the
pattern holds for sample segments of a maximum length. It would be almost
pointless to design a filter that requires the entire signal to be received,
assembled, and fully counted before deciding what it is. If it can be determined
from the first packet, though, then the filter can reject the rest of it.
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Experiment 4
This experiment determines the classifying specificity of representative samples
with a fixed upper bound on the histogram size. For each of the 4 sample sets
used in previous experiments, the count is stopped at 256, 512, 1024, 2048, and
4096 bytes, resulting in 20 cluster sets that are then analyzed just like before.
Experiment 4A uses sample set 1. Experiment 4B uses sample set 2A. Experiment
4C uses sample set 2B. Experiment 4D uses sample set 3.
The data for this section is found in Appendix B; a detailed analysis follows next.

17

Experiment 4 Analysis
The previously defined trend was for malware representative samples to get
worse and for non-malware representative samples to get better at classifying as
the ratio of malware to non-malware decreased. Experiment 3 showed that
something in sample set 3 had changed that trend, causing an improvement in
the classifying specificity of both types.
In experiments 1, 2, and 3, the set of malware representative samples tended to
have one member with high sensitivity relative to the uniform expectation.
Experiment 4 showed that sample sets 1, 2A, and 2B continued this trend for each
of the 5 segment bounds, but sample set 3 did not.
For quantification, out of each result set from the 5 experiments under the 4C
heading, the size of the malware-exemplified cluster having the greatest
combination of specificity and size was accumulated, and the result was averaged;
the sizes were 729, 786, 800, 770, and 738, with a truncated average of 764.
Thus, while maintaining high specificity, these five Netlux malware representative
samples attracted 27% of sample set 2B on average, compared with 27%
attracted by Apiary in experiment 2B. However, in experiment 4D the variables in
question were filled by the values 327, 333, 390, 495, and 482, averaging to 405
or 17% of sample set 3. Compared with the value 29%, or 700 out of 2386, from
experiment 3, this is a significant decrease in size.
The only change between executions of the apCluster utility was the underlying
byte counts, and the counts used in experiment 4 are based on the same files
counted in the previous corresponding experiments. Experiment 3 and
experiment 4D each show a trend that differs from the trend seen in experiments
1 and 2 and in experiments 4A, 4B, and 4C, respectively. The sample sets behind
those experiments differed from the sample set behind experiments 3 and 4D
only in the source of the malware samples. Taken together, these facts indicate a
fundamental difference between samples from Netlux and samples from
Cantoni’s honeypot as pertains to the objective of this work. This means one of
the sets must be chosen, excluding the other, when doing analysis to create a
malware filter. I chose to focus on the newer Cantoni archive from here on.
18

Experiment 5
Sample set: I used the size-normalized representative sample composition tuples
from the experiments on the Cantoni archive.
Question: Do the measured differences among the natural clusters represent real
properties of the underlying samples?
Tools: MS Excel
Procedure:
1. Create a copy of the sizenorm file for each sample table.
2. From each copy, remove all but the previously determined representative
samples.
3. Build a record of the 256 components of the Euclidean distance for each
pair of representative samples, normalized so that the row sum is 1 for
each row.
4. Using MS Excel, put together a spreadsheet and investigate connections
between the statistical relationships and real-world properties of the
representative sample sets.
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Experiment 5 Analysis
When a principal component analysis was done on the Euclidean distance
elements, the majority of the representative sample pairs differed primarily in the
ratio of 0x00 bytes in the files. Given that a uniform distribution over 256
features would yield less than 0.005 across the board, a value larger than 0.10 is
substantial. For most representative sample pairs, the ratio of the difference
between the 0x00 counts and the sum of all differences between counts was
above 0.90. The principal component of the distance between representative
samples was the 0x00 feature in 50 out of 52, or 96%, of the pairings within the 6
representative sample sets found in experiments 3 and 4D.
When considering executable files, the appearance of 0x00 signifies one of the
following cases: the ADD Eb,Gb opcode; the 2-byte SLDT opcode; the end of a
character string; empty bytes in a numeric value; slack space in a sector; or a byte
within a random-equivalent file segment, i.e. a packed section or an embedded
JPG. The following facts are known: that some malware makes use of SLDT during
its operation, and that using slack space at the ends of sectors is a common
infection technique. Aside from SLDT use and slack infection, there seems to be
no transparent explanation for the 0x00 phenomenon. We will focus on the
possibility of SLDT use as a classifying property.
To investigate the effect of SLDT instructions on malware classification, as well as
the classifying properties of extended opcodes in general, we will count 2-byte
opcodes in sample set 3, employing the 5 count limits used in experiment 4D in
addition to counting entire files.
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Experiment 6
Assumptions: According to the Intel x86 opcode reference, all 2-byte opcodes
begin with 0x0F as the first byte; thus, when counting the number of 2-byte
opcodes I simply retained the 256-feature model and only counted the number of
times each byte appeared after 0x0F. This method shows errors in cases where a
0x0F value appears in a non-opcode context. I chose to consider the existence of
this error margin in the analysis rather than to try removing its influence.
Materials: Sample set 3, OpcodeTableMaker, TableNormalizer,
APSimilarityPreprocessor, APPreferencePreprocessor, apCluster,
ClusterSplitterAP.
Procedure 1:
1. Run OpcodeTableMaker on the sample archive
2. Run TableNormalizer on the data
3. Run APSimilarityPreprocessor on the size-normalized data
4. Run APPreferencePreprocessor to set the preferences
5. Run apCluster using the calculated similarities and preferences
6. Run ClusterSplitterAP to place all the sample files in their correct clusters
7. Repeat 1-6 for max byte counts of 256, 512, 1024, 2048, and 4096.
Procedure 2: We perform exp. 5 on the opcode count table.
Results: AP did not converge for the 256, 512, and 1024 byte cases.
Full file case:
Representative sample

Class

# files in
cluster

6821bb6c7c39735854ec71afa727df0e
deploytk.dll
dmdskmgr.dll
kbdsp.dll
MP43DMOD.dll

Mal
Good
Good
Good
Good

1127
704
416
75
64
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# files
Classifying
of same specificity
class
907
80%
651
92%
416
100%
75
100%
63
98%

Experiment 6 Results (continued)
2048 byte case:
Representative sample

Class

# files in
cluster

5e1247a6bdb42424a806d25ac24626b5
8bc77c747cc8fdb738736b339ffd5818
5943eea30260fb1e36ee199867205b05
8842eabe965c0b94d7ba54ed65c125b5
65250e322c63df6e96a8cf448c2b0f9b
aa5dbda6ad99ccdceb2e9cc3e750f28e
catsrvps.dll
hlink.dll
kbdno.dll
napstat.exe
netevent.dll
PortableDeviceWiaCompat.dll
smlogcfg.dll

Mal
Mal
Mal
Mal
Mal
Mal
Good
Good
Good
Good
Good
Good
Good

90
148
138
105
86
128
153
139
58
141
95
1060
45

4096 byte case:
Representative sample

Class

# files in
cluster

1b525361c2435f0b9ca313771b9d82b4
1fe325940d5f28536d62bd4046b36bcf
4e46e9f237b6187b745c0b2b5a7a972c
95af9bdce8cdd936d3f250c896621e0c
531c6309f57f38e09bb3b9d21f371636
asferror.dll
kbdsw.dll
napstat.exe
sens.dll
shmgrate.exe
ssdpsrv.dll

Mal
Mal
Mal
Mal
Mal
Good
Good
Good
Good
Good
Good

90
128
88
92
157
1080
66
122
371
92
100
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# files
Classifying
of same specificity
class
85
94%
138
92%
84
61%
58
55%
73
85%
116
91%
151
99%
98
71%
58
100%
141
100%
89
94%
702
66%
45
100%

# files
Classifying
of same specificity
class
71
79%
65
51%
70
80%
82
89 %
139
89%
613
57%
66
100%
122
100%
347
94%
52
57%
97
97%

Experiment 6 Analysis
In this experiment, unlike in previous experiments, the clustering algorithm did
not converge in all cases, given the underlying data of 2-byte opcode counts. It
converged for the whole-file case, the 2048-byte case, and the 4096-byte case.
From the clustering results, I found no additional information that would be
useful in malware filtering.
When I isolated the representative samples and performed exp. 5 again, I
discovered that 0x00 was the principal component in all cases again, followed by
0x01 as the second component in the limited count cases. These opcodes signify
two instruction groups that can be used by malware to detect a virtual machine.
The next step is to measure the raw counts in all samples associated with these 2
principal components.
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Experiment 7
Question: How well are malware and non-malware separated by the sum of the
0x0F00 and 0x0F01 counts in modern malware?
Materials: Sample set 3 tables, MS Excel
Procedure:
1. Copy each opcode count table to an Excel spreadsheet.
2. Add the first two counts into a sum column and sort by the sum.
3. Split a copy of the table into these 3 classes: sum is 0, sum is 1, sum is > 1.
4. Calculate the amount of malware present in each class.
5. Repeat 1-4 for all 6 cases; cluster convergence is not a factor here.
Results:
Exemplar set
3.256
3.512
3.1024
3.2048
3.4096
3.FULL

Sum 0
23% specificity
37% sensitivity
5% specificity
6% sensitivity
5% specificity
6% sensitivity
5% specificity
6% sensitivity
7% specificity
6% sensitivity
31% specificity
3% sensitivity

Sum 1
67% specificity
46% sensitivity
71% specificity
75% sensitivity
71% specificity
73% sensitivity
66% specificity
72% sensitivity
54% specificity
54% sensitivity
65% specificity
25% sensitivity

Sum > 1
99% specificity
15% sensitivity
92% specificity
17% sensitivity
80% specificity
19% sensitivity
67% specificity
20% sensitivity
58% specificity
38% sensitivity
55% specificity
70% sensitivity

*Note: Due to truncation, the sum of sensitivities across classes is less than 100%
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Experiment 7 Analysis
The results clearly show a statistical property of malware capable of separating it
from non-malware: when the first 256 bytes of each sample were counted, 147
samples showed 2 or more occurrences of 0x0F00 or 0x0F01, and 146 of those
samples were malware. With 961 malware samples in total, we have 15%
sensitivity and 99% specificity.
In terms applicable to a practical filter, this experiment seems to suggest that a
NIDS can filter out 15% of malware currently in the wild, with a 1% FP rate, simply
by scanning the first packet once.
Unfortunately, there are 2 big problems with the results as they stand now. First,
there is no executable code in the first 256 bytes of any file, so the occurrences of
0x0F00 and 0x0F01 cannot be explained by VM checking opcodes. Second, only 1
malware sample set was used to reach these conclusions.
In exp. 8, we will apply the exp. 7 procedure to the 1st sample set as an answer to
the second problem. In exp. 9, we will answer the first problem by hex analysis.
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Experiment 8
Question: How well are malware and non-malware separated by the sum of the
0x0F00 and 0x0F01 counts in older malware?
Materials: Sample set 1 tables, MS Excel
Procedure:
1. Copy each opcode count table to an Excel spreadsheet.
2. Add the first two counts into a sum column and sort by the sum.
3. Split a copy of the table into these 3 classes: sum is 0, sum is 1, sum is > 1.
4. Calculate the amount of malware present in each class.
5. Repeat 1-4 for all 6 cases.
Results:
Exemplar set
1.256
1.512
1.1024
1.2048
1.4096
1.FULL

Sum 0
55% specificity
76% sensitivity
55% specificity
72% sensitivity
53% specificity
62% sensitivity
54% specificity
58% sensitivity
60% specificity
54% sensitivity
92% specificity
44% sensitivity

Sum 1
67% specificity
22% sensitivity
64% specificity
25% sensitivity
64% specificity
26% sensitivity
58% specificity
25% sensitivity
50% specificity
22% sensitivity
69% specificity
12% sensitivity

Sum > 1
94% specificity
< 1% sensitivity
76% specificity
2% sensitivity
82% specificity
10% sensitivity
77% specificity
16% sensitivity
62% specificity
22% sensitivity
41% specificity
43% sensitivity

*Note: Due to truncation, the sum of sensitivities across classes is less than 100%
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Experiment 8 Analysis
The results based on sample set 1 show the same high specificity of malware for
the sum class “> 1” in the 256 byte case, but the sensitivity is low; only 18
malware samples out of 1987 were captured. The trend as the count limit
increases is jumpy as well. Considering also that the sensitivity of malware in the
sum class “0” is 76%, along with the nature of the sample set, the age range of the
malware is probably the cause of these differences.
The differences between the results of these 2 experiments indicate physical
evidence of malware evolution. Modern malware instances, such as those that
appear in Cantoni’s archive, have a higher likelihood of containing VM checks
than older instances, as evidenced by this data.
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Experiment 9
Question: What is the reason for the occurrences of 0x0F00 and 0x0F01 in the
first 256 bytes of an executable file?
Materials: Sample set 1, sample set 3, HxD
Procedure: Use HxD to look for the named occurrences in the file headers.
Results: The sequence 0x0F01 seems to be part of a semi-constant string in the PE
header. In samples that fell into the sum class “> 1”, this semi-constant string
appeared within the first 256 bytes.
The part of the PE header that affects our statistics is the Characteristics field, a
word containing 16 flags. When 0x0F01 is found, this means that only the 5 flags
shown in the next illustration are set.
The Characteristics field does not serve to classify malware; the reason behind the
statistic seen in exp. 7 is the size of the MZ header that directly precedes the PE
header. If the MZ header is small, then the Characteristics field will appear within
the first 256 bytes and it is usually 0x0F01; the other occurrence typically seems
to happen by accident. If we assume that 1 occurrence has happened by
accident, then the active classifier is the length of the MZ header. In fact,
combining the MZ and PE headers is a known hex editing technique.
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PE Characteristic Flags

This image is copied from [7]. Intel hardware stores words in reverse, so that the
value 0x010F is stored as 0x0F followed by 0x01.
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Final Conclusions
Based on this work, it is apparent that a pattern capable of filtering malware with
a NIDS exists. The pattern is that the sum of 0x0F00 and 0x0F01 occurrences
within the first 256 bytes is 2 or greater in 15% of modern executables, with 99%
of those executables being malware.
The filter cannot be made complete with the current results, but it can be
partially constructed.
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Future Work
The future plan for using these results is first to construct a filter using the
occurrences of 0x0F00 and 0x0F01. After that, more experiments with modern
malware are necessary to increase the amount of malware that can be filtered
correctly. Future work thus includes more experiments like exp. 7.
Future work also includes an algorithm for maximizing the sensitivity of malware
captured by AP clustering and an investigation of 3-byte opcodes and fuzzy
matching around the counted bytes.
Future work also includes the use of different distance metrics in the clustering of
samples, such as the Kullback-Leibler divergence. KL divergence fits particularly
well within this work since the size-normalized data is essentially a probability
distribution.
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Appendix A: Glossary
Zero-day attack: the first appearance of a new malware strain
Slack space: empty space in a disk block immediately following valid file data
NIDS: Network Intrusion Detection System
Opcode: a byte or sequence of bytes referring to a valid instruction
AP: shorthand for affinity propagation
Attractiveness: the sum of a point’s similarity and availability to another point
Exemplar: a representative sample out of a data set
Distance measures: metrics for determining how similar two samples are
Euclidean distance: a distance measure based on spatial closeness
Kullback-Leibler divergence: the distance between two probability distributions
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Appendix B: Experiment 4 Data
Experiment 4A.256
Question: How is the cluster distribution different when only the first 256 bytes
are counted?
Tools: Sample set 1, TableMaker, TableNormalizer, APSimilarityPreprocessor,
APPreferencePreprocessor, apCluster, ClusterSplitterAP
Procedure:
1. Run TableMaker on the sample archive with a max byte count of 256
2. Run TableNormalizer on the data
3. Run APSimilarityPreprocessor on the size-normalized data
4. Run APPreferencePreprocessor to set the preferences
5. Run apCluster using the calculated similarities and preferences
6. Run ClusterSplitterAP to place all the sample files in their correct clusters
Results:
Representative sample
msvcrt20.dll
Constructor.DOS.DPOG.02.a
Constructor.Win32.VCL
Virus.BAT.IBBM.generic
Virus.DOS.Corrupted.RCE-2772
Virus.DOS.GCAE.x
Virus.MSWord.Ping.f
Virus.Win9x.CIH.dam

Class

# files in
cluster
Good 400
Mal
774
Mal
217
Mal
248
Mal
25
Mal
188
Mal
107
Mal
1453
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# files of
same class
202
774
216
248
25
171
107
248

Classifying
specificity
51%
100%
> 99%
100%
100%
91%
100%
17%

Experiment 4A.512
Question: How is the cluster distribution different when only the first 512 bytes
are counted?
Tools: Sample set 1, TableMaker, TableNormalizer, APSimilarityPreprocessor,
APPreferencePreprocessor, apCluster, ClusterSplitterAP
Procedure:
1. Run TableMaker on the sample archive with a max byte count of 512
2. Run TableNormalizer on the data
3. Run APSimilarityPreprocessor on the size-normalized data
4. Run APPreferencePreprocessor to set the preferences
5. Run apCluster using the calculated similarities and preferences
6. Run ClusterSplitterAP to place all the sample files in their correct clusters
Results:
Representative sample
msvbvm60.dll
HackTool.Win32.Wuftpd
Trojan.BAT.FormatC.k
Virus.Boot-DOS.ZhengZhou.3584.c
Virus.DOS.Corrupted.RCE-2772
Virus.DOS.Istanbul.1397
Virus.DOS.SillyC.432.c
Virus.MSWord.Sun

Class

# files in
cluster
Good 746
Mal
291
Mal
221
Mal
921
Mal
24
Mal
871
Mal
231
Mal
107
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# files of
same class
562
244
221
130
24
864
213
107

Classifying
specificity
75%
84%
100%
14%
100%
99%
92%
100%

Experiment 4A.1024
Question: How is the cluster distribution different when only the first 1024 bytes
are counted?
Tools: Sample set 1, TableMaker, TableNormalizer, APSimilarityPreprocessor,
APPreferencePreprocessor, apCluster, ClusterSplitterAP
Procedure:
1. Run TableMaker on the sample archive with a max byte count of 1024
2. Run TableNormalizer on the data
3. Run APSimilarityPreprocessor on the size-normalized data
4. Run APPreferencePreprocessor to set the preferences
5. Run apCluster using the calculated similarities and preferences
6. Run ClusterSplitterAP to place all the sample files in their correct clusters
Results:
Representative sample
sigverif.exe
Spoofer.Win32.VB.c
Trojan.BAT.FormatC.t
Trojan.Win32.ICQUkr
Virus.DOS.Capicua.511
Virus.DOS.Nado.Fatill.1336
Virus.MSWord.Rimes

Class

# files in
cluster
Good 706
Mal
612
Mal
218
Mal
830
Mal
25
Mal
914
Mal
107
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# files of
same class
511
204
218
137
25
897
107

Classifying
specificity
72%
33%
100%
17%
100%
98%
100%

Experiment 4A.2048
Question: How is the cluster distribution different when only the first 2048 bytes
are counted?
Tools: Sample set 1, TableMaker, TableNormalizer, APSimilarityPreprocessor,
APPreferencePreprocessor, apCluster, ClusterSplitterAP
Procedure:
1. Run TableMaker on the sample archive with a max byte count of 2048
2. Run TableNormalizer on the data
3. Run APSimilarityPreprocessor on the size-normalized data
4. Run APPreferencePreprocessor to set the preferences
5. Run apCluster using the calculated similarities and preferences
6. Run ClusterSplitterAP to place all the sample files in their correct clusters
Results:
Representative sample
hnetmon.dll
kbduk.dll
rcbdyctl.dll
VirTool.Win32.EnterRing0.b
Virus.DOS.Corrupted.RCE-2772
Virus.DOS.Nado.Fatill.1336
Virus.MSExcel.Feeder
Virus.MSWord.Rimes

Class

# files in
cluster
Good 735
Good 312
Good 731
Mal
414
Mal
28
Mal
879
Mal
214
Mal
99
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# files of
same class
524
198
484
209
28
865
214
99

Classifying
specificity
71%
63%
66%
50%
100%
98%
100%
100%

Experiment 4A.4096
Question: How is the cluster distribution different when only the first 4096 bytes
are counted?
Tools: Sample set 1, TableMaker, TableNormalizer, APSimilarityPreprocessor,
APPreferencePreprocessor, apCluster, ClusterSplitterAP
Procedure:
1. Run TableMaker on the sample archive with a max byte count of 4096
2. Run TableNormalizer on the data
3. Run APSimilarityPreprocessor on the size-normalized data
4. Run APPreferencePreprocessor to set the preferences
5. Run apCluster using the calculated similarities and preferences
6. Run ClusterSplitterAP to place all the sample files in their correct clusters
Results:
Representative sample
cleanmgr.exe
kbddv.dll
Backdoor.Win32.SubSeven.214
VirTool.Win32.PSP95
Virus.Boot-DOS.Kuarahy.4640
Virus.MSWord.Tech.c

Class

# files in
cluster
Good 639
Good 377
Mal
835
Mal
475
Mal
860
Mal
226
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# files of
same class
498
249
375
276
841
226

Classifying
specificity
78%
66%
45%
58%
98%
100%

Experiment 4B.256
Question: How is the cluster distribution different when only the first 256 bytes
are counted?
Tools: Sample set 2A, TableMaker, TableNormalizer, APSimilarityPreprocessor,
APPreferencePreprocessor, apCluster, ClusterSplitterAP
Procedure:
1. Run TableMaker on the sample archive with a max byte count of 256
2. Run TableNormalizer on the data
3. Run APSimilarityPreprocessor on the size-normalized data
4. Run APPreferencePreprocessor to set the preferences
5. Run apCluster using the calculated similarities and preferences
6. Run ClusterSplitterAP to place all the sample files in their correct clusters
Results:
Representative sample
msvcrt20.dll
Backdoor.Win32.Amitis.143
Constructor.DOS.DPOG.02.a
Trojan.Win32.Icqpush.b
Virus.DOS.Corrupted.RCE-2772
Virus.DOS.GCAE.x

Class

# files in
cluster
Good 326
Mal
103
Mal
867
Mal
1377
Mal
20
Mal
157
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# files of
same class
202
102
867
172
20
140

Classifying
specificity
62%
99%
100%
12%
100%
89%

Experiment 4B.512
Question: How is the cluster distribution different when only the first 512 bytes
are counted?
Tools: Sample set 2A, TableMaker, TableNormalizer, APSimilarityPreprocessor,
APPreferencePreprocessor, apCluster, ClusterSplitterAP
Procedure:
1. Run TableMaker on the sample archive with a max byte count of 512
2. Run TableNormalizer on the data
3. Run APSimilarityPreprocessor on the size-normalized data
4. Run APPreferencePreprocessor to set the preferences
5. Run apCluster using the calculated similarities and preferences
6. Run ClusterSplitterAP to place all the sample files in their correct clusters
Results:
Representative sample
ir50_32.dll
Virus.Boot-DOS.ZhengZhou.3584.c
Virus.DOS.Corrupted.RCE-2772
Virus.DOS.Istanbul.1397
Virus.DOS.SillyC.432.c

Class

# files in
cluster
Good 927
Mal
777
Mal
19
Mal
936
Mal
191
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# files of
same class
724
102
19
929
172

Classifying
specificity
78%
13%
100%
99%
90%

Experiment 4B.1024
Question: How is the cluster distribution different when only the first 1024 bytes
are counted?
Tools: Sample set 2A, TableMaker, TableNormalizer, APSimilarityPreprocessor,
APPreferencePreprocessor, apCluster, ClusterSplitterAP
Procedure:
1. Run TableMaker on the sample archive with a max byte count of 1024
2. Run TableNormalizer on the data
3. Run APSimilarityPreprocessor on the size-normalized data
4. Run APPreferencePreprocessor to set the preferences
5. Run apCluster using the calculated similarities and preferences
6. Run ClusterSplitterAP to place all the sample files in their correct clusters
Results:
Representative sample
kbdsl.dll
sigverif.exe
Trojan.Win32.ICQUkr
Virus.DOS.Nado.Fatill.1336

Class

# files in
cluster
Good 451
Good 662
Mal
751
Mal
986
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# files of
same class
213
511
67
969

Classifying
specificity
47%
77%
9%
98%

Experiment 4B.2048
Question: How is the cluster distribution different when only the first 2048 bytes
are counted?
Tools: Sample set 2A, TableMaker, TableNormalizer, APSimilarityPreprocessor,
APPreferencePreprocessor, apCluster, ClusterSplitterAP
Procedure:
1. Run TableMaker on the sample archive with a max byte count of 2048
2. Run TableNormalizer on the data
3. Run APSimilarityPreprocessor on the size-normalized data
4. Run APPreferencePreprocessor to set the preferences
5. Run apCluster using the calculated similarities and preferences
6. Run ClusterSplitterAP to place all the sample files in their correct clusters
Results:
Representative sample

Class

hnetmon.dll
kbdhela2.dll
msvcp50.dll
rcbdyctl.dll
VirTool.DOS.Apiary
Virus.DOS.SillyOC.2000

Good
Good
Good
Good
Mal
Mal
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# files in
cluster
637
274
328
685
905
21

# files of
same class
522
199
206
485
892
21

Classifying
specificity
82%
73%
63%
71%
99%
100%

Experiment 4B.4096
Question: How is the cluster distribution different when only the first 4096 bytes
are counted?
Tools: Sample set 2A, TableMaker, TableNormalizer, APSimilarityPreprocessor,
APPreferencePreprocessor, apCluster, ClusterSplitterAP
Procedure:
1. Run TableMaker on the sample archive with a max byte count of 4096
2. Run TableNormalizer on the data
3. Run APSimilarityPreprocessor on the size-normalized data
4. Run APPreferencePreprocessor to set the preferences
5. Run apCluster using the calculated similarities and preferences
6. Run ClusterSplitterAP to place all the sample files in their correct clusters
Results:
Representative sample
cleanmgr.exe
kbddv.dll
msvcp50.dll
HackTool.Win32.NetHacker
VirTool.DOS.Apiary

Class

# files in
cluster
Good 605
Good 315
Good 325
Mal
738
Mal
867
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# files of
same class
520
249
199
293
855

Classifying
specificity
86%
79%
61%
40%
99%

Experiment 4C.256
Question: How is the cluster distribution different when only the first 256 bytes
are counted?
Tools: Sample set 2B, TableMaker, TableNormalizer, APSimilarityPreprocessor,
APPreferencePreprocessor, apCluster, ClusterSplitterAP
Procedure:
1. Run TableMaker on the sample archive with a max byte count of 256
2. Run TableNormalizer on the data
3. Run APSimilarityPreprocessor on the size-normalized data
4. Run APPreferencePreprocessor to set the preferences
5. Run apCluster using the calculated similarities and preferences
6. Run ClusterSplitterAP to place all the sample files in their correct clusters
Results:
Representative sample
msvcrt20.dll
Trojan.BAT.KillFiles.at
Trojan.Win32.Icqpush.b
Trojan-Dropper.Win32.Delf.cf
Virus.DOS.GCAE.x

Class

# files in
cluster
Good 382
Mal
202
Mal
1411
Mal
729
Mal
126
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# files of
same class
202
201
206
729
109

Classifying
specificity
53%
> 99%
15%
100%
87%

Experiment 4C.512
Question: How is the cluster distribution different when only the first 512 bytes
are counted?
Tools: Sample set 2B, TableMaker, TableNormalizer, APSimilarityPreprocessor,
APPreferencePreprocessor, apCluster, ClusterSplitterAP
Procedure:
1. Run TableMaker on the sample archive with a max byte count of 512
2. Run TableNormalizer on the data
3. Run APSimilarityPreprocessor on the size-normalized data
4. Run APPreferencePreprocessor to set the preferences
5. Run apCluster using the calculated similarities and preferences
6. Run ClusterSplitterAP to place all the sample files in their correct clusters
Results:
Representative sample

Class

Spoofer.Win32.VB.c
Trojan-Dropper.Win32.Raven
Virus.Boot-DOS.ZhengZhou.3584.c
Virus.DOS.Corrupted.Eddie.Sign
Virus.DOS.Istanbul.1397

Mal
Mal
Mal
Mal
Mal
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# files in
cluster
325
778
786
175
786

# files of
same class
236
160
93
157
779

Classifying
specificity
73%
21%
12%
90%
99%

Experiment 4C.1024
Question: How is the cluster distribution different when only the first 1024 bytes
are counted?
Tools: Sample set 2B, TableMaker, TableNormalizer, APSimilarityPreprocessor,
APPreferencePreprocessor, apCluster, ClusterSplitterAP
Procedure:
1. Run TableMaker on the sample archive with a max byte count of 1024
2. Run TableNormalizer on the data
3. Run APSimilarityPreprocessor on the size-normalized data
4. Run APPreferencePreprocessor to set the preferences
5. Run apCluster using the calculated similarities and preferences
6. Run ClusterSplitterAP to place all the sample files in their correct clusters
Results:
Representative sample
msr2cenu.dll
sigverif.exe
Trojan.Win32.ICQUkr
VirTool.DOS.WeirdBinder

Class

# files in
cluster
Good 588
Good 666
Mal
796
Mal
800
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# files of
same class
207
512
106
784

Classifying
specificity
35%
77%
13%
98%

Experiment 4C.2048
Question: How is the cluster distribution different when only the first 2048 bytes
are counted?
Tools: Sample set 2B, TableMaker, TableNormalizer, APSimilarityPreprocessor,
APPreferencePreprocessor, apCluster, ClusterSplitterAP
Procedure:
1. Run TableMaker on the sample archive with a max byte count of 2048
2. Run TableNormalizer on the data
3. Run APSimilarityPreprocessor on the size-normalized data
4. Run APPreferencePreprocessor to set the preferences
5. Run apCluster using the calculated similarities and preferences
6. Run ClusterSplitterAP to place all the sample files in their correct clusters
Results:
Representative sample
hnetmon.dll
kbduk.dll
rcbdyctl.dll
VirTool.DOS.Apiary
VirTool.Win32.EnterRing0.b

Class

# files in
cluster
Good 713
Good 297
Good 687
Mal
770
Mal
383
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# files of
same class
524
198
485
757
178

Classifying
specificity
73%
67%
71%
98%
46%

Experiment 4C.4096
Question: How is the cluster distribution different when only the first 4096 bytes
are counted?
Tools: Sample set 2B, TableMaker, TableNormalizer, APSimilarityPreprocessor,
APPreferencePreprocessor, apCluster, ClusterSplitterAP
Procedure:
1. Run TableMaker on the sample archive with a max byte count of 4096
2. Run TableNormalizer on the data
3. Run APSimilarityPreprocessor on the size-normalized data
4. Run APPreferencePreprocessor to set the preferences
5. Run apCluster using the calculated similarities and preferences
6. Run ClusterSplitterAP to place all the sample files in their correct clusters
Results:
Representative sample
cleanmgr.exe
msvcp50.dll
regwiz.exe
Backdoor.Win32.SubSeven.214
VirTool.DOS.Apiary

Class

# files in
cluster
Good 553
Good 389
Good 363
Mal
807
Mal
738
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# files of
same class
469
201
276
340
726

Classifying
specificity
85%
52%
76%
42%
98%

Experiment 4D.256
Question: How is the cluster distribution different when only the first 256 bytes
are counted?
Tools: Sample set 3, TableMaker, TableNormalizer, APSimilarityPreprocessor,
APPreferencePreprocessor, apCluster, ClusterSplitterAP
Procedure:
1. Run TableMaker on the sample archive with a max byte count of 256
2. Run TableNormalizer on the data
3. Run APSimilarityPreprocessor on the size-normalized data
4. Run APPreferencePreprocessor to set the preferences
5. Run apCluster using the calculated similarities and preferences
6. Run ClusterSplitterAP to place all the sample files in their correct clusters
Results:
Representative sample

Class

# files in
cluster

msacm.dll
msvcrt20.dll
88ced2768eba4b2b77372726850bdfad
bdd14a3ccfa6c7162e425266bce0c729

Good
Good
Mal
Mal

1449
375
327
235

49

# files
Classifying
of same specificity
class
1180
81%
220
59%
320
98%
217
92%

Experiment 4D.512
Question: How is the cluster distribution different when only the first 512 bytes
are counted?
Tools: Sample set 3, TableMaker, TableNormalizer, APSimilarityPreprocessor,
APPreferencePreprocessor, apCluster, ClusterSplitterAP
Procedure:
1. Run TableMaker on the sample archive with a max byte count of 512
2. Run TableNormalizer on the data
3. Run APSimilarityPreprocessor on the size-normalized data
4. Run APPreferencePreprocessor to set the preferences
5. Run apCluster using the calculated similarities and preferences
6. Run ClusterSplitterAP to place all the sample files in their correct clusters
Results:
Representative sample

Class # files in
cluster

23ddbaed383511a9968f53b7bdbbf2e9
581a6310045be2711de6105d4cf3f354
5b760960b279a54b984d5d9ccc9560b7
e732601321962a9810986d418e839ae2
ff20a4b54baaedf479805d44013bb443

Mal
Mal
Mal
Mal
Mal
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781
883
273
333
116

# files
Classifying
of same specificity
class
17
2%
309
35%
217
79 %
320
96 %
98
84%

Experiment 4D.1024
Question: How is the cluster distribution different when only the first 1024 bytes
are counted?
Tools: Sample set 3, TableMaker, TableNormalizer, APSimilarityPreprocessor,
APPreferencePreprocessor, apCluster, ClusterSplitterAP
Procedure:
1. Run TableMaker on the sample archive with a max byte count of 1024
2. Run TableNormalizer on the data
3. Run APSimilarityPreprocessor on the size-normalized data
4. Run APPreferencePreprocessor to set the preferences
5. Run apCluster using the calculated similarities and preferences
6. Run ClusterSplitterAP to place all the sample files in their correct clusters
Results:
Representative sample

Class

# files in
cluster

ctl3d32.dll
onex.dll
0526a33d93d1bc96d7ea3cfe20fed0bf
235abf3acbb7b052e83a481f53a7c46b
e92b09accfabaaaf0566444c7224e079

Good
Good
Mal
Mal
Mal

916
560
406
114
390
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# files
Classifying
of same specificity
class
601
66%
535
96%
194
48%
99
87%
328
84%

Experiment 4D.2048
Question: How is the cluster distribution different when only the first 2048 bytes
are counted?
Tools: Sample set 3, TableMaker, TableNormalizer, APSimilarityPreprocessor,
APPreferencePreprocessor, apCluster, ClusterSplitterAP
Procedure:
1. Run TableMaker on the sample archive with a max byte count of 2048
2. Run TableNormalizer on the data
3. Run APSimilarityPreprocessor on the size-normalized data
4. Run APPreferencePreprocessor to set the preferences
5. Run apCluster using the calculated similarities and preferences
6. Run ClusterSplitterAP to place all the sample files in their correct clusters
Results:
Representative sample

Class

# files in
cluster

hnetmon.dll
msvcp50.dll
2f1bfdfc7045e1ae0b70acd1c646e77c
f6b8239db7a1b96fd9afd3df0725c13f

Good
Good
Mal
Mal

633
367
495
891
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# files
Classifying
of same specificity
class
572
90%
227
62%
404
82%
356
40%

Experiment 4D.4096
Question: How is the cluster distribution different when only the first 4096 bytes
are counted?
Tools: Sample set 3, TableMaker, TableNormalizer, APSimilarityPreprocessor,
APPreferencePreprocessor, apCluster, ClusterSplitterAP
Procedure:
1. Run TableMaker on the sample archive with a max byte count of 4096
2. Run TableNormalizer on the data
3. Run APSimilarityPreprocessor on the size-normalized data
4. Run APPreferencePreprocessor to set the preferences
5. Run apCluster using the calculated similarities and preferences
6. Run ClusterSplitterAP to place all the sample files in their correct clusters
Results:
Representative sample

Class

# files in
cluster

netsh.exe
regwiz.exe
783128a871bfec9ebbd2e2595a5be2b7
8dfac3855eb7f4cf36b7826e640c8c0e
c1b1a396e2d9ad407fe00c1ec56c101b

Good
Good
Mal
Mal
Mal

446
248
482
336
874

53

# files
Classifying
of same specificity
class
432
97%
243
98%
447
93%
135
40%
360
41%

Appendix C: Source Code
TableMaker.java
import java.io.*;
class TableMaker
{
public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception
{
int huge = 2000000000;
File mainDir = new File(args[0]);
File[] samples = mainDir.listFiles();
FileInputStream input;
int[] byteCounts = new int[256];
String[] sampleTable = new String[samples.length];
PrintWriter output;
int readLength = huge;
try
{
readLength = Integer.parseInt(args[1]);
output = new PrintWriter(args[0] + "." + readLength + ".data");
}
catch(Exception e)
{
readLength = huge;
output = new PrintWriter(args[0] + ".data");
} // if a limit is provided as an argument, use it; otherwise the limit is ~2GB
int holder;
int filePosition;
for(int i = 0; i < samples.length; i++)
{
try
{
input = new FileInputStream(samples[i]);
for(int j = 0; j < 256; j++) byteCounts[j] = 0;
filePosition = 0;
holder = input.read();
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while(holder != -1 && filePosition < readLength)
{
holder = (holder + 256) % 256;
byteCounts[holder] = byteCounts[holder] + 1;
filePosition++;
holder = input.read();
} // read and count bytes until the limit or EOF is reached
sampleTable[i] = samples[i].toString() + ",";
for(int j = 0; j < 256; j++)
{
sampleTable[i] = sampleTable[i] + byteCounts[j] + ",";
} // construct the 256-feature data line for the current sample
sampleTable[i] = sampleTable[i].substring(0, sampleTable[i].length() - 1); // drop trailing ,
output.println(sampleTable[i]); // print the line to the data file
}
catch(FileNotFoundException fnf)
{
System.out.println(samples[i]);
} // if the file is not there, print its name to the console
}
output.close();
}
}
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TableNormalizer.java
import java.io.*;
class TableNormalizer
{
public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception
{
File mainTable = new File(args[0]);
String dataline = "";
String[] tokens;
double numTotalBytes;
double normalizedByteRatio;
String outputLine = "";
BufferedReader console = new BufferedReader(new FileReader(mainTable));
PrintWriter output = new PrintWriter(args[0] + ".sizenorm");
dataline = console.readLine();
while(dataline != null)
{
tokens = dataline.split(",");
numTotalBytes = 0.0;
for(int i = 1; i < 257; i++) // position 0 is the filename
{
numTotalBytes = numTotalBytes + Double.parseDouble(tokens[i]);
} // get sum of counts for current line
if(numTotalBytes = 0.0) numTotalBytes = 1.0; // required to avert DivZero errors
outputLine = tokens[0] + ",";
for(int i = 1; i < 257; i++)
{
normalizedByteRatio = Double.parseDouble(tokens[i]) / numTotalBytes;
outputLine = outputLine + normalizedByteRatio + ",";
} // normalize counts as fractions of the sum of counts
outputLine = outputLine.substring(0, outputLine.length() - 1);
output.println(outputLine);
dataline = console.readLine();
}
output.close();
}
}
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APSimilarityPreprocessor.java
import java.io.*;
class APSimilarityPreprocessor
{
public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception
{
File mainTable = new File(args[0]);
String dataline = "";
String[] tokens;
double[] pointOne = new double[256];
double[] pointTwo = new double[256];
double similarity;
double[][] dataPoints = new double[30000][256]; // recompile if more than 30000 samples
int lastRowIndex = 0;
BufferedReader console = new BufferedReader(new FileReader(mainTable));
PrintWriter output = new PrintWriter(args[0] + ".similarities");
dataline = console.readLine();
while(dataline != null)
{
tokens = dataline.split(",");
for(int i = 0; i < 256; i++)
{
dataPoints[lastRowIndex][i] = Double.parseDouble(tokens[i + 1]);
}
lastRowIndex = lastRowIndex + 1;
dataline = console.readLine();
}
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for(int i = 1; i <= lastRowIndex; i++)
{
pointOne = dataPoints[i - 1];
for(int j = 1; j <= lastRowIndex; j++)
{
if(j != i)
{
pointTwo = dataPoints[j - 1];
similarity = -1.0 * euclideanDistance(pointOne, pointTwo); // AP uses negative similarities
output.println("" + i + " " + j + " " + similarity);
}
}
} // calculate and store all pairwise distances
output.close();
}
static double euclideanDistance(double[] pointOne, double[] pointTwo)
{
if(pointOne.length != pointTwo.length) return -1.0; // one should avoid letting this happen
double sum = 0.0;
double partDiff = 0.0;
for(int i = 0; i < pointOne.length; i++)
{
partDiff = pointOne[i] - pointTwo[i];
sum = sum + (partDiff * partDiff);
}
return Math.sqrt(sum);
}
}
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APPreferencePreprocessor.java
import java.io.*;
class APPreferencePreprocessor
{
public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception
{
File mainTable = new File(args[0]);
String dataline = "";
BufferedReader console = new BufferedReader(new FileReader(mainTable));
PrintWriter output = new PrintWriter(args[0] + ".preferences");
dataline = console.readLine();
while(dataline != null)
{
output.println("-15.561256"); // default preference; all are set equally
dataline = console.readLine();
}
output.close();
}
}
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ClusterSplitterAP.java
import java.io.*;
class ClusterSplitterAP
{
public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception
{
int arrayMax = 30000; // recompile if more than 30000 samples
File clusterDefinitions = new File(args[0] + ".clusters/idx.txt");
File dataTable = new File(args[0]);
String[] fileNames = new String[arrayMax];
BufferedReader console = new BufferedReader(new FileReader(dataTable));
File workingFile;
FileInputStream input;
FileOutputStream output;
String sourceFile;
String clusterDirectory;
String destinationFile;
String dataline = "";
String[] tokens;
int positionCounter = 0;
int slashIndex = 0;
dataline = console.readLine();
while(dataline != null)
{
tokens = dataline.split(",");
fileNames[positionCounter] = tokens[0];
positionCounter++;
dataline = console.readLine();
}
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console = new BufferedReader(new FileReader(clusterDefinitions));
positionCounter = 0;
dataline = console.readLine();
while(dataline != null)
{
sourceFile = fileNames[positionCounter];
destinationFile = fileNames[Integer.parseInt(dataline) - 1];
slashIndex = destinationFile.indexOf("\\");
destinationFile = destinationFile.substring(slashIndex + 1, destinationFile.length());
clusterDirectory = args[0] + ".clusters/" + destinationFile + ".ap";
// the directories are named for the representative samples
try
{
workingFile = new File(clusterDirectory);
workingFile.mkdir();
}
catch(Exception e) {} // if it’s not there, make it; otherwise do nothing
slashIndex = sourceFile.indexOf("\\");
destinationFile = sourceFile.substring(slashIndex + 1, sourceFile.length());
destinationFile = clusterDirectory + "\\" + destinationFile; // split around the \ and rebuild
workingFile = new File(sourceFile);
input = new FileInputStream(workingFile);
output = new FileOutputStream(destinationFile); // place copies within correct clusters
int holder = input.read();
while(holder != -1)
{
output.write(holder);
holder = input.read();
} // copy file byte by byte
output.close();
dataline = console.readLine();
dataline = console.readLine(); // IDX files are double-spaced
positionCounter++;
}
}
}
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EuclideanDistanceTabulator.java
import java.io.*;
// calculate and store 256 components of pairwise Euclidean distances for use in PCA
class EuclideanDistanceTabulator
{
public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception
{
File mainTable = new File(args[0]);
String dataline = "";
String[] tokens;
double[] pointOne = new double[256];
double[] pointTwo = new double[256];
double[] differences = new double[256];
double diffLineTotal;
double[][] dataPoints = new double[30000][256]; // recompile if more than 30000 samples
int lastRowIndex = 0;
BufferedReader console = new BufferedReader(new FileReader(mainTable));
PrintWriter output = new PrintWriter(args[0] + ".differences");
dataline = console.readLine();
while(dataline != null)
{
tokens = dataline.split(",");
if(tokens.length == 257) // ignore malformed rows
{
for(int i = 0; i < 256; i++)
{
dataPoints[lastRowIndex][i] = Double.parseDouble(tokens[i + 1]);
}
lastRowIndex = lastRowIndex + 1;
}
dataline = console.readLine();
}
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for(int i = 1; i <= lastRowIndex; i++)
{
pointOne = dataPoints[i - 1];
for(int j = 1; j <= lastRowIndex; j++)
{
if(j != i)
{
pointTwo = dataPoints[j - 1];
if(pointOne.length == pointTwo.length)
{
dataline = "";
diffLineTotal = 0.0;
output.print("" + i + "," + j + ",");
for(int k = 0; k < pointOne.length; k++)
{
differences[k] = pointOne[k] - pointTwo[k];
differences[k] = differences[k] * differences[k];
diffLineTotal = diffLineTotal + differences[k];
} // get the sum of all components on the current line
for(int k = 0; k < pointOne.length; k++)
{
differences[k] = differences[k] / diffLineTotal;
dataline = dataline + differences[k] + ",";
} // normalize each component against the line sum
dataline = dataline.substring(0, dataline.length() - 1);
output.print(dataline + "\n"); // output 256 normalized distance metric components
}
}
}
}
output.close();
}
}
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